We present the concept of Just-In-Time (JIT) static analysis that interleaves code development and bug xing in an integrated development environment. Unlike traditional batch-style analysis tools, a JIT analysis tool presents warnings to code developers over time, providing the most relevant results quickly, and computing less relevant results incrementally later. In this paper, we describe general guidelines for designing JIT analyses. We also present a general recipe for transforming static data-ow analyses to JIT analyses through a concept of layered analysis execution. We illustrate this transformation through C , a JIT taint analysis for Android applications. Our empirical evaluation of C on real-world applications shows that our approach returns warnings quickly enough to avoid disrupting the normal work ow of developers. This result is con rmed by our user study, in which developers xed data leaks twice as fast when using C compared to an equivalent batch-style analysis.
INTRODUCTION
More companies are integrating static analysis checks in their development process to detect software bugs early in the development Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. ISSTA'17, Santa Barbara, CA, USA © 2017 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. 978-1-4503-5076-1/17/07. . . $15.00 DOI: 10.1145/3092703.3092705 lifecycle. However, most static analysis tools, such as Microsoft's PRE x/PREfast [9, 32] , HP Fortify [19] , and Coverity [14] , are designed to be used in batch mode, because analyzing real-life projects can easily take hours. Therefore, many companies run static analysis tools at major release points in the product lifecycle or as part of nightly builds. In those use cases, developers pour over long lists of warnings (often in the order of thousands of warnings for real-life projects), deciding which messages correspond to real errors that require a x [4, 22, 26, 38] . Running static analysis tools in this batch mode limits the potential utility of static analysis: by the time the results are generated, the developer may have forgotten the coding context to which these results pertain.
In this paper, we propose the Just-in-Time (JIT) static analysis concept, in which we advocate for the integration of static analysis into the development work ow, allowing developers to immediately see the impact of their changes in the code without blocking them from performing other coding tasks. Integrating the analysis into the development environment (IDE) enables reporting more manageable, "digestible" sets of warnings almost continuously, instead of providing the user with a long list of warnings at the end of the analysis run. We also advocate for a di erent delivery strategy for the results: return simple-to-x and more precise results rst and use the time that the developers take to address them to compute more complex, false-positive-prone results later, while integrating developer feedback.
We instantiate this concept through a layered analysis, which starts at the program point currently edited by the developer, gradually expanding the analysis scope to encompass methods, classes, les, and modules further away. Early analysis layers quickly produce intra-procedural results, known to yield few false positives. Later layers may nd more complex results further out, but also run the risks of higher analysis running times and more false positives.
To concretely illustrate the concept of JIT static analysis, we instantiate the layered JIT analysis framework with C , a JIT taint analysis for Android applications, that we have made publicly available [10] . To evaluate the bene ts and shortcomings of our JIT approach compared to a traditional batch-style analysis, we have conducted an empirical evaluation of C using real-world Android applications, as well as a user study with 18 participants. This paper makes the following contributions:
• It proposes the concept of JIT analysis that interleaves the process of computing analysis warnings with that of the developer xing them. • It describes how a large class of existing data-ow analyses can be transformed to JIT analyses using a layered analysis approach.
• It shows how such a layered JIT analyzer can be built for taint analysis and applied to Android applications to nd potentially insecure information ows.
• It empirically evaluates the implementation, focusing on performance and developer experience. Our experiments show that C returns results on real-world programs in less than a second, and developers can address leaks twice as fast compared to a batch-style analysis.
OVERVIEW
Despite years of work on eliminating false positives in static analysis tools, end-user experience tends to be overwhelming, even for the unsound (or optimistic) commercial tools; this is sometimes called the "wall of bugs" e ect [22] . Observing how developers interact with static analysis tools, we highlight that: (1) reporting a warning is e ectively useless if it is unlikely to be examined or result in a bug x; and (2) some true warnings are abandoned because they are di cult to deal with [6] . To address both problems, batch-style tools typically draw developers' attention to speci c high-priority warnings by applying post-analysis ltering and ranking to report the results higher or lower in the result list [12, 13] . Analyses that run in the background of the IDE can also report the results earlier or later in time, allowing developers to focus on a subset of warnings while the analysis computes further results. This approach of interleaving analysis and developer activities reduces the perceived analysis latency, improving the overall usability of an integrated analysis tool. Building on those observations, we de ne the following requirements for any sensible JIT analysis:
• Prioritization: The analysis must report the results most relevant to the user rst.
• Responsiveness: To provide the users with immediate feedback on their changes, the analysis should report the earliest results quickly.
• Monotonicity: A reported issue cannot be refuted until the developer has xed it: the analysis only adds warnings over time.
Therefore, a JIT analysis is not a re nement of an imprecise pre-analysis.
Examples of JIT Analysis
Determining what is relevant to the user directly in uences what should be reported rst by a JIT analysis. We outline concrete examples for expressing various relevance metrics in three dataow analyses.
Taint Analysis.
A taint analysis tracks sensitive data ows from sources to sinks to detect privacy leaks [16, 21, 39] . In Figure 1 , a taint analysis reports two leaks: from the source on line 3 to the sinks on line 8 A , and line 17 B . The sink on line 12 is never reached, because line 11 overwrites the tainted variable x with non-sensitive data.
When writing code, developer attention is focused on the particular parts of the code that they are editing. Hence, it is sensible to prioritize warnings by locality, i.e., report those warnings that are closest to the user's working set rst. For example, if the user is editing the main method in Figure 1 , A should be reported rst, because it is located in the same method as the edit point. B should be reported later, as it is located in a di erent class.
API Misuse Detection.
To ensure correct API usage, analyses verify that programs follow a certain usage protocol [1] . In Figure 2 , the analysis veri es that a cryptographic cipher is always initialized with init before a call to doWork. Result C is harder to detect than D , because the call to maybeInit on line 22 may resolve to either of the two implementations of the method. Applying an ordering by locality, a JIT analysis for API misuse detection can nd D before C , because nding C requires computing information over three di erent classes compared to two.
Another strategy based on con dence could prioritize monomorphic calls to polymorphic calls, as the latter are more likely to yield false positives. Similarly, a strategy based on computational resources could delay the computation polymorphic calls, as they create more data ows than monomorphic calls. In general, local results are not just the most relevant to the user's current task, they should also be computed precisely and quickly.
Nullness Analysis.
A nullness analysis searches for null dereferences to avoid runtime errors. In Figure 3 , a nullness analysis reports three warnings: E because f points to null, F because f and g must-alias after the assignment statement on line 42, and G due to the may-alias on line 44 . While E takes minimal computation to nd, F and G require additional alias information. In real-world programs, such ows can become exponentially more complex, and take minutes of computation to be reported, holding back the delivery of other simpler results that could be xed in the meantime. With an ordering strategy by con dence, E can be reported quickly, while alias information is computed to nd F and then G .
Correcting the rst warnings early enables the JIT analysis to update the results. For example, xing E , automatically xes F and G as well. This early x reduces the total number of warnings that are presented to the user.
JIT ANALYSIS THROUGH LAYERING
In this section, we discuss how one can transform an existing dataow analysis into a locality-based JIT analysis. Our approach reorganizes the analysis into locality-based layers. The goal is to immediately report the results closest to the user's working set. Lower analysis layers run rst, yielding the rst results in a few seconds. The following layers enrich the analysis by computing increasingly complex results.
Locality-Based Layers for Android
To analyze Android applications, we propose a layered analysis that computes warnings by gradually increasing the analysis scope, i.e., by taking more code into consideration, starting at the current edit point. Table 1 shows the set of layers for this strategy. Prioritization comes by design, with a prioritization strategy based on locality.
Responsiveness is ensured as lower layers require minimal class Table 2 shows the warnings that the JIT analyses described in Section 2.1 report using the layering system of Table 1 for the examples in Figures 1-3 . The JIT taint analysis reports the direct leak A at L1. Supposing that classes A and B are in the same le, B is reported after the resolution of the call on line 7, at L4. The JIT API misuse detection reports C and D after the two calls to maybeInit on lines 22 and 26, respectively. Assuming that the calls are not in the same package as the encrypt method, C is reported in L7 and D in L6. Since the layering system does not include alias-speci c information, the three null dereferences E , F and G are reported at L1.
Layered Analysis Examples

Layering an Existing Analysis
To ease exposition, we describe how to transform into a layered JIT analysis such analyses that are distributive [35] , i.e., in which ow functions f distribute over the merge operator: f (x) ⊓ f ( ) = f (x ⊓ ). Therefore, one can compute ows independently from one another and in any order, without loss of precision. Layering non-distributive analyses is possible but more complex, and we leave its description to future work.
Definitions.
A trigger is a statement at which the JIT analysis pauses the propagation of certain data-ow facts to prioritize others. In Figure 1 , the triggers are the two calls to sendMessage PQ := {initialT ask()} //init priority queue 3: computedT asks = ∅
4:
while PQ ∅ do 5: pop task t o priority queue PQ 6: if t computedTasks then 7:
(t) 8: computedTasks ∪ = {t } 9: procedure ( l, s t , in ) 10:
wl := {s t } //init worklist 11:
while wl ∅ do 13: pop s o wl
14:
if isTri er (s) and s t s then 15: for l ′ ∈ {1..|la ers |} do 16:
add new task l ′ , s, in ′ to PQ 
20:
OUT
wl ∪ = succ(s)
PQ returns tasks with the lowest priority layers rst. initialT ask(), isTri er (), la er (), f s () are parameters of the analysis.
on lines 6 and 7. At those triggers, the JIT analysis propagates u before propagating s and t to prioritize reporting A , because it is in the same method as the starting point main. The choice of propagating s or t next depends on the priority layers. Data-ow facts created at a trigger create a task. In Figure 1 , two tasks are created: one with the initial set {s} with priority L2, because the call to sendMessage on line 6 resolves to a call in the same class, and one with the set {t} with priority L4, because the call to sendMessage on line 7 resolves to a call in the same le. The analysis executes the rst task because its priority layer is lower, propagating s until the next trigger, or the end of the program, and then executes the second task to report B .
Algorithm.
We present Algorithm 1 as a general recipe to transform a distributive data-ow analysis in a JIT analysis.
The procedure analyze, excluding lines 14-17, represents a standard xed-point iteration for a traditional data-ow analysis that applies the ow function f s to the statements of a program (line 21) until the OUT sets remain unchanged. The transformation to a JIT analysis divides this large xed-point iteration into smaller ones (tasks). At trigger points, the JIT analysis forces an intermediate xed-point by not modifying the OUT set (line 14), stopping the current analysis task prematurely. Non-trigger statements are handled in the same way that the traditional analysis does (lines 18-23).
To eventually compute the same results as the traditional analysis, the JIT analysis creates new tasks at triggers, and adds them to the priority queue PQ to be executed later (lines [15] [16] [17] . When a task is executed, the JIT analysis pops the next highest-priority task from PQ. It then creates a new instance of the traditional analysis, and initializes it with the appropriate IN set, to continue the propagation where the previous task stopped. The role of the priority queue is to prioritize task propagation to report certain warnings rst. This is determined by layer(s,i,l), returning the priority layer l' of the new task that will continue propagating the fact i at statement s, knowing that it was paused at layer l.
While there are multiple ways of instantiating the JIT concept, Algorithm 1 requires minimal changes to adapt existing analyses: (1) a priority queue is added to the solver, (2) no changes are introduced into the original ow functions f s (), leaving the de nition of the data-ow problem entirely unmodi ed, and (3) the analysis writer can instantiate di erent priority systems independently from the solver and the ow functions through initialT ask(), isTri er (), and la er ().
Termination. Algorithm 1 extends an existing traditional analysis. If the traditional analysis terminates, the inner loop (line 12) is guaranteed to terminate for all analysis instances, because the algorithm does not modify the IN and OUT sets. The outer loop (line 4) also terminates, because the number of created tasks is bounded. Tasks depend on their associated set of facts. If the dataow lattice of the traditional analysis is bounded, the number of facts, therefore tasks, is also bounded. Line 6 checks that no task is computed twice, ensuring termination and improving e ciency.
Soundness. To be as sound as the base traditional analysis, the JIT analysis checks that every data-ow fact created by the ow functions of the traditional analysis is assigned to at least one layer. Algorithm 1 partitions the IN set of a statement into smaller sets (line 16). For this operation to be safe, the data-ow facts should be separable, i.e., the analysis problem should be distributive so that data-ow facts can be independently distributed between the layers. We further improve e ciency by assigning each data-ow fact of an IN set to exactly one layer.
Requirements. We summarize the requirements for creating a JIT analysis according to Algorithm 1:
• The base analysis must terminate.
• The analysis problem must be distributive.
• The priority layers must provide a complete and disjoint partitioning of the IN set. Layering by locality as described in Table 1 ful lls these requirements by using method calls as triggers, and partitioning IN sets according to their callees. Other layering strategies can be used to t other problems, e.g., by con dence or computational resources.
CHEETAH: A JIT TAINT ANALYSIS
Following our proposed layered approach, we have implemented C , a JIT taint analysis that detects data leaks in Android applications. C is built on top of the Soot analysis framework [40] and the Heros IFDS solver [7] . IFDS is a framework for solving inter-procedural nite distributive subset problems as graph-reachability problems on a directed graph representing the facts of interest to the analysis at each program point within the exploded super-graph [35] . We use IFDS as a succinct way to dene C based on a simple IFDS taint analysis that tracks explicit data-ows. C uses the sources and sinks de nitions Edges are labeled by the analysis task that creates them. The unlabeled edges are created by task T 0 .
described by Rasthofer et al. [33] . We have made C publicly available online, along with all experimental data [10].
IFDS Flow Functions
The IFDS ow functions map each existing data-ow fact to its successors. For a taint analysis, a typical ow function (1) generates new taint ows if it encounters source methods; (2) kills taints if the tainted variable is overwritten by non-tainted data; or (3) propagates taint if tainted references are assigned to other references. There are four types of IFDS ow functions, which we illustrate in Figure 4 for the running example from Figure 1 .
• Normal ow functions: are applied at each statement that is not a call, e.g., s is mapped to t on line 4.
• Call ow functions: are applied at each call statement. They propagate the data-ow facts from the caller to the callee, e.g., t is mapped to on line 7.
• Return ow functions: are applied at call statements, and map the facts from the callee back to the caller.
• Call-to-return ow functions: are applied at each call statement, and propagate the facts that are not a ected by the call, e.g., u is mapped to u on line 7. For a detailed presentation of C 's ow functions, we refer the reader to our technical report [30] .
Layered Taint Analysis
Using the layers in Table 1 and Algorithm 1 to transform a traditional IFDS taint analysis into C , we de ne:
C marks all call sites as triggers, meaning that the dataow propagations at call sites are paused and continued in subsequent tasks. The layer that is assigned to a fact at a call site is determined by the distance (in terms of the priority layers) between the callee and the start point of the analysis, which is the method containing the current edit point. For example, if C encounters a call to a method that is in the same le but not the same class as the starting point, the new task is assigned L4. As a result, one task creates as many tasks as the number of call sites it contains. New tasks are added to the priority queue PQ, and executed in order of distance from the starting point. To adapt Algorithm 1 to the IFDS framework, we apply the following changes:
• Every time a task is executed (line 7), C creates a new IFDS instance starting at the task's start statement (s t ), and initializes it with the facts contained in its in-set. To reuse previously computed results, the state of the IFDS solver is carried over from one instance to the next.
• The priority queue PQ is initialized with the task {L1, stmt, {0}}, where stmt is the rst statement of the currently edited method, and 0 is the initial fact for a standard IFDS propagation.
• To create new tasks at call sites, C slightly modi es the call ow function of the traditional analysis to stop the propagation of data-ow facts at call sites (by returning the empty set), except when the call is the start statement of the current task. At a call site, C collects the variables that need to be propagated further (i.e., the parameters of the call, the static variables, and the receiver of the call) in an inSet. A new task {la er (stmt), stmt, inSet } is then added to PQ to be executed later. This change corresponds to lines 14-17 in Algorithm 1.
• The normal, return, and call-to-return ow functions remain the same as the traditional analysis.
Example: Applying C to the example in Figure 1 results in the following steps (also shown in Figure 4 ):
(1) The user triggers the analysis at the main method. Task T 0 = {L1, line 3, {0}} is enqueued. (2) T 0 is executed, resulting in the unlabeled edges.
(a) A is found and reported (b) Task T 1 = {L2, line 6, {0, s}} is created. (c) Task T 2 = {L4, line 7, {0, t }} is created. (3) T 1 is executed, resulting in the edges labeled T 1 . (4) T 2 is executed, resulting in the edges labeled T 2 , and B is reported.
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We empirically evaluate C by comparing it to B , the traditional IFDS taint analysis that we transformed to obtain C . Our experiments address the following research questions:
RQ1: How responsive is C compared to B ? RQ2: How early does C report warnings? RQ3: Are the initial ndings of C easier to interpret than later ones? C and B have the same ow functions, except for the slight modi cation to the call ow function described in Section 4.2 which enables us to make B just-in-time. To model the Android lifecycle, B uses a dummy main method that models the Android lifecycle of an application [2] . C models the Android lifecycle on a per-class basis by distributing the dummy main over the layering system. Currently, both B and C resolve virtual calls by using a simple CHA-based callgraph [5] .
Tools
Experimental Setup
Our benchmark suite contains 14 Android applications selected from F-Droid [17] , such that each application has a GitHub repository with more than one commit and is available for mining in Boa [15] . We used Boa to collect the methods modi ed in each commit, referred to as SPB (Starting Points Boa). Each application has at least 26 unique SPB (min: 26, max: 316, median: 127). We ran two experiments. In the rst one, we ran C 20 times for each application using randomly selected SPB as starting points for the analysis. In the second experiment, we chose the sources of known data leaks that were obtained from the rst experiment as the starting points, referred to as SPS (Starting Points Sources). SPS represent cases when the user is investigating a particular bug, SPB, cases when the user does not actively use C during code development. B has one starting point: a dummy main method that acts as the entry point to the Android application [2] .
We ran our experiments on a 64-bit Windows 7 machine with one dual-core Intel Core i7 2.6 GHz CPU running Java 1.8.0_102, and limited the Java heap space to 1 GB.
Results
RQ1: How responsive is CHEETAH compared to BASE? We have measured the time that C takes to report the rst, second, third, and last result when it starts at SPB and at SPS. We compare those times to the time it takes B to report its nal results. Figure 5 shows, in log scale, the total response time for those quantities, which includes the overhead time taken by C to load and process the initial set of classes. Across our benchmark,
C
reports the rst result in a median time of less than 1 second when it starts at SPB and a median of less than 0.5 seconds when it starts at SPS. These results are below Nielsen's 1 second recommended threshold for interactive user interfaces, suggesting that C usually allows the "user's ow of thought to stay uninterrupted" [31] . C reports its last result in a median time of 9.03s and 7.79s when it starts at SPB and SPS, respectively. Both medians are larger than the median times of 1.85s (SPB) and 2.13s (SPS) that B takes to report its nal results. This is because C analyzes parts of the program that are not reachable from its main entry points, a feature that traditional analyses such as B do not o er. Any analysis imprecision in those parts propagates to the other computations, making the analysis perform more work than strictly necessary. Nevertheless, such a feature is desirable for real-life code development scenarios, which we discuss in Section 8.
returns the rst result in less than one second, allowing the developer to remain focused.
RQ2: How early does CHEETAH report warnings?
One of the main goals of C is to better help software developers detect bugs located around their working sets compared to using traditional analyses. This means that C should ideally report most of its warnings in earlier layers. Figure 6 shows that, across our benchmark, when C starts at SPB, a median of 38.97% of the warnings is reported in L5 and a median of 44.12% in L6. Starting at SPS, C reports a median of 32.56% warnings in L5 and a median of 15.77% in L6. With SPS, C reports more warnings in earlier layers: a median of 4.58% in L1 and a median of 5.13% in L3. Unlike SPB, SPS simulates scenarios where users are interested in the analysis results. In those cases, 33.3% of the warnings are reported at L1-L4 on average, against 11.6% for SPB. This shows that if C is guided towards the points of interest in a program, more warnings are reported at earlier layers. Additionally, in Figure 5 , we see that the rst results are returned faster with SPS (e.g. medians of 1 second (SPB) and 0.5 seconds (SPS) for the rst result). Therefore, starting at SPS is optimal when the user requires analysis updates while xing a particular warning.
After C reports a leak, a separate module retrieves the paths between the leak's source and sink to provide the user with more information. The process of retrieving those paths times out in less than 1% of all the cases (average: 0.81%, median: 0%). It is important to note that, for those timeouts, C itself does not time out, but the path-nding module does.
Across our benchmark, no results are reported in L7, because none of the applications pass sensitive information through polymorphic calls. Similarly, no warnings are reported in L8, because C currently does not support inter-component ows.
C reports most of the warnings in L5-L6. If directed to known sources of bugs, C reports the rst warnings faster, and it reports more warnings in earlier layers.
RQ3: Are the initial ndings of CHEETAH easier to interpret than later ones? The quick response time of C is only useful if the rst few warnings that it reports are easy to interpret by the user. Otherwise, the user will spend most of her time trying to trace her way through the program to x that warning. We approximate the ease of interpretation of the initial warnings that C reports by computing the trace length: the number of statements between the source and the sink for a given warning. Figure 7 shows the trace lengths for the warnings that appear in each layer of C . When C starts at SPB, the median length of the traces for the initial layers L1-L4 is 0, 1, 4, and 4 statements, respectively. For later layers, C reports more complex warnings with longer trace lengths: medians of 26 and 25 statements for layers L5 and L6, respectively. Starting at SPS, C reports more warnings in earlier layers. In such a case, the median length of the traces that C reports for the initial layers L1-L4 is a median of 4, 2, 12, and 1 statements, respectively.
In layers L1-L4, C reports warnings with shorter traces than later layers, making them easier to interpret.
GRAPHICAL USER-INTERFACE
Interleaving analysis and developer activities requires careful reporting. Otherwise, warnings can literally become moving targets in result lists as new ones are found and others are xed, which confuses the developer. Figure 8 captures the main GUI elements of C that we have introduced to support reporting warnings over time. These features, described below and highlighted with the corresponding numbers in the gure, address the observations made during our pilot study. A demo of the GUI is available online [10]. 2. Color-coded warnings: Warnings in C have three states: active (con rmed by the latest analysis run), computing (found by the previous analysis run, but not yet con rmed by the current run), and xed. C displays active warnings in black and computing warnings in gray. Fixed warnings are grayed out for one run of the analysis, and removed from the view at the next run. This feature provides a light history of xed leaks, allowing users to quickly check if a x was e ective. 3. Descriptive icons: C displays source and sink icons on the left gutter. When a warning is grayed out in the Overview, the corresponding icons are also grayed out. Tooltips provide additional information on the leaks. 4. Seamless run: To integrate C in Eclipse, we trigger the analysis every time the project is built. C hooks into Eclipse's incremental builder and re-runs the analysis starting from the method that has the focus.
Other features:
C also provides a few features that are not JIT-speci c, such as highlighting the path of the leak that the user is currently examining.
USER STUDY
In a user study, we evaluate how a JIT analysis integrates into the development work ow compared to a batch-style analysis. 18 participants performed development tasks using C or B to keep the number of data leaks to a minimum.
An earlier pilot study with 11 participants showed that the prototype had poor usability. GUI-related issues prevented participants from focusing on their tasks. We xed those issues before conducting the study we describe in this section.
Setup
7.1.1 Participants. Our study includes 18 participants of varying backgrounds (9 academics and 9 professional developers), with di erent skill levels in terms of Android development and knowledge of taint tracking static analysis tools. In the following, we identify them as P1 . . . P18 1 .
Tasks.
In order to evaluate the in uence of the analysis tools on the development work ow, each participant performed a development task: removing code duplicates in an Android application. At the same time, we asked them to keep the number of data leaks to a minimum. To help detect potential data leaks, C or B were provided as Eclipse plugins. To x the leaks, we provided the participants with data sanitization APIs. Each task was limited to 10 minutes.
7.1.3 Protocol. Each participant performed one task per tool (B and C ). Before each task, the participants warmed up on a small Android application to get used to the tool. The order of the tools was randomized, so that half of the participants started with C , and the other half with B . Afterwards, the participants lled a comparative questionnaire and were interviewed in person. The questionnaire, responses, and the interview protocol are available online [10].
Test Applications.
The warm-ups were performed on a small, arti cial Android application that contained 6 simple data leaks. The two tasks were performed on a real-life application from F-Droid [17] : Bites, a basic cookbook app. Due to the limited time (10 minutes per task), we have modi ed Bites to add data leaks around code duplications, resulting in a total of 106 more complex data leaks. This ensured that participants encountered data leak warnings while conducting their duplication removal task. In the pilot study, some participants had spent most of their time handling code duplicates not related to any data leaks.
GUI.
To reduce any GUI-induced bias, the GUI used for B is almost identical to C 's. For this study, B emulates a batch-style tool: B is not triggered on code build, but by pressing a button. A popup then blocks the GUI to prevent the user from modifying the code while the analysis is running. All results are shown at the same time after the analysis nishes. Figure 9 shows, in log scale, the distribution of the time taken to x a leak for the two main tasks. The reported numbers take into account the time taken to x a leak, discarding the time needed by the participant to understand the code, the tool, or to discuss the solution before implementing it. For Tasks 1 and 2, participants using C took half as long as the participants using B to x a leak (0.53× and 0.45×, respectively). For Task 1, the median time to x a leak using B was 63 seconds, compared to 33.5 seconds per leak for C users. The times reported for Task 2 are lower: 54.5 seconds per leak for B and 24.5 seconds per leak for C . This is because by Task 2, participants are more familiar with the application and the tasks. We also note that across both tasks, the participants were signi cantly faster when using C compared to B (p < .01, Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test), regardless of whether they used B rst and C second (2.6× faster), or C rst and B second (1.6× faster). We also observed that in the 10 minutes allocated to each task, C users xed more leaks than B users, with a median of 2 leaks for B users and 4 leaks for C users in Task 1. For Task 2, the medians are 3 leaks for B users and 4 leaks for C users. The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test failed to detect a signi cant di erence in the number of leaks xed (p = .31).
Results
Using C enables users to x leaks twice as fast compared to using B .
Questionnaire
After the four tasks, the participants lled a questionnaire comprised of 29 questions designed to assess the merits of the two approaches, also providing some open-ended comments to compare C to B . The participants answered several 5-point Likert-type questions from the System Usability Scale (SUS) [8] , a questionnaire designed to measure the e ectiveness and eciency of a system, and rated both tools using a Net Promoter Score (NPS) [34] , an 11-point Likert scale that measures their likelihood of recommending the tool to a friend.
Overall, the participants responded positively to C . Among the participants who rated C and B on the NPS question (n = 16), C 's mean score is 7.4 (out of 10) compared to a mean score of 2.7 for B . According to the aggregated SUS scores, 12 participants rated C higher than B . Using a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test [41] , we observed signi cant (p < 0.05) di erences between these aggregated scores and participant's responses on 4 of the individual SUS questions. Compared to B , participants less likely found C unnecessarily complex or cumbersome (-0.6 mean response each). Moreover, the participants responded that they were more likely to use C frequently (+0.7 mean response), and more likely found its functions wellintegrated (+0.5 mean response).
Interviews
During the individual interviews, the participants were asked to detail their experience of the tools, focusing on the percieved differences, in particular waiting times, integration of the tools in the IDE, and warning ordering. The interviews lasted 14 minutes on average (min: 10 minutes, max: 23 minutes). We now present notable comments and behavior.
Quick Updates. In total, 12 participants found C 's quick updates useful, noting this feature as the main advantage of the tool. Professional developers in particular, noted that this system is "much more comfortable, and what I would expect in the Eclipse environment" (P7). P2 noted that C "integrates well into the Eclipse build-on-save paradigm". This results in a "more fluent workflow" (P9), as opposed to B , which proved more interruptive to the participants: "having to wait interrupts the coding and thinking process" (P6). P4 explained from their personal experience with UI-blocking compilation tools that they "do a context switch in your head. [...] When you are back to the actual work, you might have forgo en what you wanted to do". In summary, participants felt that for code development, C was less interruptive, as it allowed them to deviate less from their coding tasks.
Ordering. P8, a professional Android developer, noticed the order in which the results were reported with C , and commented, when using B : "When I'm in one class, I get familiar with it, and when I click on a warning, it takes me to a completely di erent class, and I have to get used to it again", which further validates the choice of layers in C . P18, in particular, handled the leaks in the presented order. P18 xed all encountered leaks when using C , but skipped most of the rst warnings when using B after deeming their traces "too long". We see that reporting warnings following C 's layers positively a ects participant performance and integrates more discretely in their work ow.
Performance. Two expert participants expressed performance concerns about C running too often on big projects: "if the analysis a ects the performance, I would like to have a bu on to control it" (P13).
Comparison.
The participants were asked in which cases they would use one tool rather than the other.
• Twelve participants reported C is best suited for code development. P9, in particular, noted that it would make the development task slightly harder, but it would "force me to write be er code from scratch".
• Two participants were concerned about using C for big projects because "if it has a big impact on the CPU, it might be annoying and I might not be as productive" (P4).
• Eleven participants noted that B should be used infrequently or in situations where debugging and coding are separated: "a er a milestone" (P9), "creating reports for so ware" (P7).
• No participants reported they would use B for code development. Twelve out of 17 participants preferred C for code development due to its quick updates. Two participants expressed concerns about CPU overhead. C 's inherent ordering helps code developers perform bug-xing tasks.
DISCUSSION
A traditional whole-program analysis usually starts from a main method and propagates through the code that is reachable from there. This approach is ill-suited for the scenario of code development, where developers often work on new features in incomplete programs that may not even have a main method. C provides full code coverage by arti cially creating tasks that are not naturally induced by the code base. In addition to the tasks that it naturally creates, a task on Lx arti cially creates all tasks on Lx-1 which are in its scope and a task on Lx+1 initialized with its own starting point. Therefore, the rst task of the analysis, which is at L1, generates a task at L2, which in turn generates a task at L3, eventually generating a task at L8. This last task encompasses the whole project, therefore, the set of tasks at L7 that it creates also covers the whole project, eventually resulting in a full coverage of the source code at lower layers. An extra check ensures that no task is executed twice. Because of the priority queue, tasks with lower layers are executed rst. Therefore, the tasks of L1 generated by a task of L2 will be executed before the task of L3 generated by this same L2 task is executed. This ensures C 's prioritization by locality. This approach ensures that the entire code base is analyzed and enables C to help software developers reason about unreachable code, a property that a traditional IFDS-based taint analysis does not provide.
In our evaluation, the IFDS taint analysis B uses a dummy main as described by Arzt et al. [2] and only reports leaks in those parts of the code that are reachable from that method using a CHA call-graph. On the other hand, C provides full code coverage, resulting in more reported warnings and a longer overall analysis time. In our empirical experiments, C reports 2.1× more warnings compared to B (min: 1×, max: 10×, geometric mean: 2.06×). Since B and C have the same IFDS ow functions, they have the same soundness and precision by construction. By covering more of the code base, C provides the code developer with a more relevant result set than traditional analyses such as B .
A JIT analysis's layering system can support more complex layering schemes. For example, in C , more layers can be added to improve the aliasing strategy. Currently, C computes aliases intra-procedurally, and ignores inter-procedural aliases. A more complex aliasing strategy could be instantiated by computing aliases together with the taint analysis such that both analyses share the same scope. When the analysis scope widens, more aliases are discovered, adding more taints to the analysis. A whole-program alias analysis could also be used in one of the later layers operating on the project scope.
RELATED WORK
Given the vast amount of research on static analysis, we focus this section quite narrowly, highlighting the interactions between static analysis tools and developers.
Human Aspects of Static Analysis Tools
Several researchers have studied the usage of static analysis tools by developers. Sadowski et al. [36] report that most Google developers nd static analysis warnings usable. Phang et al. [23] found that a program ow visualization tool helps developers quickly triage warnings. Ayewah and Pugh [3] found that checklists helps developers consistently evaluate warnings. In an experiment, Smith et al. [38] characterized the information needs of developers while addressing warnings. In contrast, our work focuses on smoothly integrating static analysis warnings into developers' work ows. Several human studies have highlighted challenges related to work ow integration. Johnson et al. [22] recorded interviewees stressing the importance of integrating static analysis into their work ows. Lewis et al. [26] found that almost all interviewed developers agreed that static analysis should not disrupt their work ow. Through interviews and surveys, Xiao et al. [43] and Witschey et al. [42] found that developers whose security tools help them do their work quickly report being more likely to adopt those tools. Christakis and Bird [11] interviewed and surveyed Microsoft developers who complained that existing tools are too slow and do not t into their work ow. Accordingly, our work aims to address work ow integration problems by providing relevant static analysis results quickly.
Warning Prioritization
Researchers have proposed several ways to prioritize which warnings developers should address rst. Industrial tools tend to use heuristics, such as FindBugs [18] , which classi es warnings as low, medium, or high priority. Surveying the research, Muske and Serebrenik [28] organize prioritization approaches into three main categories: statistical, historical, and user-feedback. As an example of a user-feedback based approach, Heckman and Williams [20] use machine learning to prioritize actionable warnings over unactionable ones. As an example of a history-aware approach, Kim and Ernst [24] use code history to prioritize defects. Other approaches do not easily t into these categories. For example, Shen et al. [37] deprioritize predicted false positives, then use developer feedback for future prioritization. As another example, Liang et al. [27] use resource leak defect patterns to prioritize potential resource leaks. While prior approaches prioritize using the warning or the code, our approach instead (1) prioritizes using a developer's working context, and (2) uses that context to guide the analysis itself.
Result Presentation
Several prior researchers have investigated how to best present analysis results to the user. For example, Solstice [29] focuses on non-disruptive reporting. It runs an o ine analysis on a replica of the developer's workspace, reporting results in a non-disruptive manner. In contrast, C is an interactive analysis of the original codebase in the IDE, without code replication.
Parfait [12, 13] runs an initial bug detector then cascades di erent analyses in layers of an increasing order of complexity and a decreasing order of e ciency to con rm the initial ndings. Unlike C , one layer in Parfait may invalidate some of the bugs that a previous layer has already reported. In C , each layer uses previously computed information to detect new bugs and does not invalidate previously reported warnings, minimizing the disruption in the developer's work ow.
C reports warnings in a similar way to how Eclipse's incremental compiler reports errors to a user while editing source les [25] . This is the same approach used by ASIDE [44] , an Eclipse plugin that detects security vulnerabilities in Java programs. ASIDE incrementally reports errors to the user by only analyzing recent code changes. C is a whole-program analysis, but it still incrementally reports warnings to the user by starting at speci c points of interest in the program (e.g., a recently modi ed method). Although incremental analyses compute minimal changesets and C recomputes everything at each run, C consistently provides the rst results quickly while some changesets can cause an incremental analysis to fully recompute its results. Nevertheless, we plan to incrementalizeC to improve the responsiveness of its later layers L5-L8.
CONCLUSION
We have presented the novel concept of JIT analysis that interleaves the processes of code development, static analysis execution, and bug xing, through a layered static analysis approach. We have shown how to obtain a JIT analysis by modifying a base distributive data-ow analysis with minimal changes. We have also provided C , an implementation of a JIT taint analysis for nding privacy leaks in Android applications, and evaluated it on realworld applications. Our empirical results, questionnaire results, and a detailed user study show that C 's quick updates and ordering strategy make it particularly well-suited for integrating bug xing within the natural ow of code development.
